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The New GSP+ Benefi ciaries: Ticking the Box or Truly Consistent 
with ILO Findings?
JAN ORBIE* AND LISA TORTELL**
Abstract. In the past decade, the European Union (EU) has committed itself to promot-
ing the social dimension of globalization, focusing mostly on the promotion of labour 
 standards internationally through increased cooperation with the International Labour 
Organization (ILO) and by means of its external trade policies. This article addresses these 
two dimensions of the Union’s global social policies, by examining whether EU practise 
in Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) labour conditionality has been consistent with 
ILO assessments. In particular, we utilize a ‘hierarchy of condemnation’ to examine the 
implementation record of core labour standards (CLS), as evaluated by the ILO commit-
tees entrusted with assessing countries’ observance of conventions. This analysis makes 
clear that, although EU decisions to sanction countries through its GSP scheme are trace-
able to the level of condemnation by the ILO, consistency between the granting of GSP+ 
incentives and ILO assessments is less clear-cut and cannot entirely be explained by the 
EU’s attempts to use GSP+ to stimulate the implementation of CLS. Finally a number of 
explanations for these fi ndings are given, pointing in particular to path-dependent proc-
esses in the EU decision-making system.
I  Introduction
In the past decade the European Union (EU)1 has committed itself to promoting 
the social dimension of globalization. It is argued that the Union could export 
several elements of the European social model, which ensures that social and 
economic aims go hand in hand, to the world scene. The EU has mostly focused 
on the promotion of labour standards internationally through increased coopera-
tion with the International Labour Organization (ILO) and by means of its exter-
nal trade policies. This article addresses these two dimensions of the Union’s 
global social policies by examining the role of the ILO in the EU’s Generalized 
System of  Preferences (GSP). It raises the question of whether EU practice in 
GSP labour conditionality has been consistent with ILO assessments. In particu-
lar, we tackle the thorny question of implementation of the fundamental ILO 
 * Centre for EU Studies, Ghent University.
 ** DINAMIA-ISCTE, Lisbon.
 1 The terms ‘European Union’ (EU), ‘Union’ or ‘Europe’ are used interchangeably, even when 
strictly speaking the European Community (EC) applies.
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 Conventions in those countries benefi ting from the EU’s trade incentives, the 
‘GSP+’  benefi ciaries.
The fi rst section of this article elaborates on the EU’s policies in promoting the 
social dimension of globalization through GSP conditionality and in  cooperation 
with the ILO. The second section analyses the increasing relevance of the ILO 
in the GSP Regulations of the EU, which now explicitly require ‘ratifi cation and 
effective implementation’ of the ILO fundamental conventions and refer to ILO 
activities. Nevertheless, while the GSP+ benefi ciary countries have ratifi ed the 
relevant ILO Conventions, their implementation has been questioned by policy 
makers, academics and civil society groups. In order to solve this puzzle, the 
third section establishes a ‘hierarchy of condemnation’ allowing us to analyse the 
implementation record of GSP+ benefi ciaries as evaluated by the ILO commit-
tees. It appears that the application of GSP sanctions by the EU links with ILO 
assessments, but that the consistency between GSP+ incentives and ILO fi ndings 
is less clear-cut. Several countries have received GSP+ preferences despite being 
seriously criticized by the authoritative ILO committees for their implementation 
of the relevant conventions. The conclusions give a number of explanations why 
certain countries have been included in the GSP+ system and why the EU has been 
reluctant to withdraw trade preferences, despite serious condemnations by the ILO. 
It will become clear that this is, to a large extent, a story of path-dependent logics 
in the EU’s decision-making system.
This analysis has wide-ranging implications for the current debate on the appli-
cation of GSP labour standard conditionality. In 2004, the then Trade Commis-
sioner Pascal Lamy hailed the GSP conditionality system as a clear example of 
Europe’s ‘soft power’ and as a ‘step toward better global governance’.2 However, 
Members of the European Parliament,3 representatives from the trade unions 
and development non-governmental organizations (NGOs),4 as well as academ-
ics,5 have criticized the current system, suggesting that the EU is too reluctant to 
sanction developing countries that are condemned by ILO organs, and that some 
countries have benefi ted from incentives despite ILO criticism.6 This debate has, 
 2 P. Lamy, Financial Times, 21 Oct. 2004.
 3 See, e.g., EP Resolution OJ ref B6-0583/2006 PE 381.813v01-00; Written Questions E-3338/07, 
E-4197/06, E-4090/06, P-4146/06; and Oral Question with Debate O-0093/06.
 4 E.g., ‘Civil Society Dialogue meeting on New Scheme of Generalized Tariff Preferences’ 
<http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2007/july/tradoc_135225.pdf>, 10 Aug. 2008; ICFTU/WCL/
ETUC, ‘Reports on Core Labour Standards in the Countries Applying for the GSP-Plus’, <www.
icftu.org/www/PDF/GSP.pdf>, 10 Aug. 2008.
 5 See T. Novitz, ‘In Search of a Coherent Social Policy: EU Import and Export of ILO Labour 
Standards?’, in The European Union and the Social Dimension of Globalization: How the EU 
 Infl uences the World, eds J. Orbie & L. Tortell (London and New York: Routledge, 2008), 34–35; 
T. Greven, Social Standards in Bilateral and Regional Trade and Investment Agreements (Geneva: 
Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2005).
 6 See also the transcripts of a debate between academics, policy makers, NGOs and trade unions 
on the EU and the social dimension of globalization at <www.eu-sdg.ugent.be> (2 Jan. 2009).
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to date, been based only on anecdotal arguments. This article attempts a more 
systematic analysis of the consistency between the application of EU conditional-
ity and ILO assessments. In doing so, it also provides an empirical contribution 
to scholarly research on EU conditionality toward developing countries, on the 
normative power Europe thesis, and on the relationship between the EU and inter-
national institutions.
II  Promoting the Social Dimension of Globalization
The EU has highlighted its commitment to promoting the social dimension of 
 globalization in several policy documents.7 In line with the report of the ILO 
World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization, the Union consid-
ers this global governance objective in the widest sense, as involving decent work, 
sustainable development, democracy and accountability, and gender equality. This 
covers a range of policies (for example, jobs and decent work, health, education, 
social security) and policy instruments (development aid, trade relations, social 
and development policies, political dialogue) pursued in the EU’s neighbourhood, 
in other parts of the world and in various multilateral institutions. EU initiatives 
have mainly focused on the promotion of international labour standards as defi ned 
by the ILO. In its global social policies, the EU has largely strived to advance the 
four core labour standards (CLS) abstracted from eight fundamental ILO Conven-
tions, as stated in the 1998 ILO Declaration on Fundamental Rights and Principles 
at Work.
The EU has pursued the CLS through two mechanisms, namely trade condi-
tionality and cooperation with the ILO. As explained in the introductory article to 
this special issue and in the contribution by Brian Burgoon, attempts by European 
Commission and most Member States to integrate CLS at the level of the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) began in 1994. Although the EU has always insisted 
that it aims at rewarding, rather than sanctioning, countries, and that it does not 
seek harmonization of social policies and wages but confi nes itself to promot-
ing the most fundamental standards linked with respect for human rights, it has 
not been very successful. Evading this stalemate at the multilateral level, the EU 
introduced labour standards in its unilateral GSP trade regime. Under international 
trade law, the GSP constitutes a major exception of the Most-Favoured Nations 
(MFN) principle for developing countries. The MFN rule (General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Article 1) requires that members of the WTO cannot 
discriminate between their trading partners, but the GSP (legalized by the Enabling 
Clause within the framework of the GATT) allows for a more favourable treat-
ment for developing country imports. The GSP systems established by industrial 
countries typically differentiate market access according to the development level 
of the recipient country and the sensitivity of certain products. In addition, a GSP 
 7 For an overview, see Orbie & Tortell (eds), supra n. 5.
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can include labour standard conditionality,8 whereby violation of labour stan-
dards leads to the withdrawal of trade preferences (sliding back to MFN rates) and 
compliance leads to additional GSP preferences (between normal and tariff-free 
access). In that sense, the threat of sliding back to MFN rates can be seen as a stick, 
and the possibility of being granted additional preferences leading to a tariff-free 
access operates as a carrot.
Since 1995 the EU has included such a social ‘carrot and stick’ conditionality 
in its GSP. Subsequent revisions of the European GSP Regulations in 1998, 2001 
and 2005 have modifi ed and expanded the role of labour standards in Europe’s 
GSP. The GSP sanction clause was introduced in 1995 and has since been applied 
to Burma (1997) and Belarus (2007). The incentive regime, established in 1998 
and reformed into the GSP+ system in 2005, has granted more favourable mar-
ket access to fi fteen countries. As explained below, the ILO takes an increasingly 
prominent place in the application of this social conditionality system.
This is the second priority area of EU international social policies: in addition to 
the trade track, the EU has strengthened its cooperation with the ILO since 2001. 
At a general level, both institutions have emphasized their harmonious relationship 
and the convergence between Europe’s regional social model and the ILO’s global 
social agenda. The European Commission played an active role in the process 
of the ILO World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization. The 
importance of the ‘European model’ for a social globalization was highlighted in 
the report of the World Commission and in various speeches by ILO offi cials and 
EU policy makers.9 Institutionally, cooperation between both institutions intensi-
fi ed with an exchange of letters in 2001. Since then, high-level meetings between 
the Commission and the ILO have been held annually. In 2004 the EU and the 
ILO engaged in a Strategic Partnership explicitly targeted to developing countries. 
Under this framework more specifi c activities have been developed, involving 
European Commission co-funding of ILO initiatives or the ILO involvement in 
EU programmes.10 
Such collaboration could increase the power and legitimacy of both the EU 
and the ILO. However, some comments should be noticed.11 First, the European 
Commission’s capacity to act in the ILO is limited. Member States have always 
resisted granting formal competences to the Community in the context of the ILO. 
 8 L. Compa & J.S. Vogt, ‘Labor Rights in the Generalized System of Preferences: A 20-Year 
Review’, Comparative Labor Law & Policy Journal 2, no. 3 (2001): 199–238.
 9 E.g., European Commission and ILO, ‘Final Joint Conclusions of the 5th High-Level Meeting’ 
(Geneva, 13 Oct. 2006); A. Diamantopoulou, ‘Address at the Seminar on the social dimension of 
globalisation organized by the European Commission and the WCSDG’ (Brussels, 3 Feb. 2003).
 10 J. Orbie & O. Babarinde, ‘The Social Dimension of Globalization and European Union 
 Development Policy: Promoting Core Labour Standards and Corporate Social Responsibility’, 
 Journal of European Integration 3 (2008): 465–469.
 11 See also the discussion in J. Orbie & L. Tortell, ‘Exporting the European Social Model: 
 Broadening Ambitions, Increasing Coherence?’, Journal of European Social Policy (2009): 99–104.
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Within the ILO the European Commission is a non-voting observer, incapable 
of voting on the adoption of conventions or recommendations; nor is it possi-
ble for the EU to ratify ILO Conventions.12 Second, the asymmetrical nature of 
the EU-ILO relationship has been criticized, which is particularly relevant because 
both organizations have a different mandate. Since the ILO is the most vulner-
able partner, its social purposes may be eroded by the market-oriented infl uence 
of the EU.13 Third, even when the EU is exporting its ambitious social rules to the 
level of the ILO, this may have adverse consequences for the ILO and its non-EU 
members. Kissack’s empirical research shows that the EU’s promotion of ambi-
tious ILO Conventions has the perverse effect that their international diffusion 
is limited: the more the EU is involved in drawing up an ILO Convention, the 
less ratifi cation the resulting convention receives from ILO members. Questioning 
the often assumed ‘natural synergy’ between the two institutions, he claims that 
‘exporting the EU model into the ILO creates a lose-lose scenario, where the ILO 
gets a widely ignored maximal standard, and the EU gets a negligible extension of 
its own standards internationally’.14
How can we explain the new-found enthusiasm of the EU within the ILO? For 
one thing, the ILO has successfully reinvented itself by the end of the 1990s in the 
context of the social clause debate in the WTO. The ILO seems a more realistic 
and more credible alternative for the impasse of the social debate at the multilateral 
trade level. Another reason why the European Commission embraced the ILO’s 
agenda on the social dimension of globalization and decent work is that this nor-
mative and development-oriented agenda is less contested by EU Member States 
than the formal drafting of labour standard conventions. More generally, the EU’s 
growing commitment to multilateralism since the end of the 1990s15 makes the 
ILO one of the multilateral organizations central in the EU’s global governance 
policies. By anchoring its external policies in the cosmopolitan values promoted 
by multilateral institutions such as the ILO, the EU strengthens its legitimacy and 
its assumed role as a normative power in the world.
 12 T. Novitz, supra n. 5. But the intensity, quality and scope of EU coordination in the ILO – exe-
cuted by the Commission in tandem with the Council Presidency – may have increased since 2001. 
R. Delarue, ‘ILO-EU Cooperation on Employment and Social Affairs’, in The United Nations and 
the European Union, eds J. Wouters et al. (The Hague: TMC Asser Press, 2006), 93–114; P. Neder-
gaard, ‘The EU at the ILO’s International Labour Conference: A “Double” Principal-Agent Analy-
sis’, in The European Union and International Organizations, ed. K.E. Jörgensen (London and New 
York: Routledge, 2008), 149–166; M. Riddervold, ‘Interest or Principles? EU Foreign Policy in the 
ILO, RECON Online Working Paper 9 (2008). A. Johnson, ‘EU-ILO Relations between Regional 
and Global Governance’, in  Orbie &. Tortell (eds), supra n. 5, 81–97.
 13 Novitz, supra n. 5.
 14 Kissack, ‘“How to Lose Friends and Alienate People?” Uploading European Labour  Standards 
into the ILO’, Journal of European Social Policy 19, no. 2 (2009): 99–116, at 115.
 15 European Commission, ‘White Paper on European Governance’, 25 Jul. 2001.
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III  The Growing Role of the ILO in the EU’s GSP Regime
When analysing the EU’s GSP Regulations, an increased role for the ILO can 
be discerned. When the sanction clause was introduced in 1995, the ILO was 
scarcely involved. The legal basis for temporary withdrawal under the social GSP 
was ‘practise of any form of forced labour’ or ‘export of goods made by prison 
labour’.16 The European Commission had a relatively large margin of appreciation 
in the suspension procedure in case of violations of the relevant labour standards, 
although the fi nal responsibility lay with the Council of Ministers.17 ILO fi ndings 
were not mentioned in the sanctioning process.
This system soon resulted in two complaints by the international trade union 
movement against alleged abuses of labour rights. In the case of Burma/Myanmar, 
the Commission decided to investigate practises of forced labour. In March 1997 
the Council approved the Commission’s conclusion that Burma’s tariff  preferences 
should be withdrawn.18 By contrast, a complaint in 1997 against child labour in 
Pakistan never resulted in an investigation, let alone a withdrawal of trade prefer-
ences, allegedly because the social GSP clause did not yet allow for a suspension 
on the basis of child labour.19
In 2001 the EU extended the reasons for temporary withdrawal to include ‘seri-
ous and systematic violation of any standards referred to in the ILO Declaration on 
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work’.20 In addition, ILO fi ndings will serve 
as the ‘point of departure’ in the investigation as to whether temporary withdrawal 
is justifi ed (consideration 19):
The available assessments, comments, decisions, recommendations and 
 conclusions of the various supervisory bodies of the ILO, including in particular 
Article 33 procedures should, serve as the point of departure for the examination 
of requests for the special incentive arrangements for the protection of  labour 
rights, as well as for the investigation as to whether temporary withdrawal is 
justifi ed on the grounds of violations of ILO Conventions.
Since then only Belarus has joined Burma on the list of Europe’s GSP sanc-
tions. Following a complaint in 2003 and subsequent investigation, in 2005 the 
 16 Article 9(1).
 17 B. Brandtner & A. Rosas, ‘Trade Preferences and Human Rights’, in The EU and Human 
Rights, ed. P. Alston (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 715.
 18 Council Regulation, OJ 1997, L 85.
 19 Other reasons have been advanced: see G. Tsogas, ‘Labour Standards in the Generalized 
 Systems of Preferences of the European Union and the United States’, European Journal of Indus-
trial Relations 3 (2000): 362; M. Dispersyn, ‘La dimension sociale dans le Système des Préférences 
Généralisées de l’Union Européenne’, Revue du Droit ULB 23 (2001): 109; E. Fierro, The EU’s 
Approach to Human Rights Conditionality in Practice (The Hague/London/New York: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 2003), 367; Brandtner & Rosas, supra n. 17, 717–718.
 20 The provision on exports of goods made by prison labour remains unchanged.
668 JAN ORBIE AND LISA TORTELL
 Commission found that Belarus was in violation of ILO Conventions Nos 87 and 
98.21 At the end of 2006 the Council of Ministers agreed on trade sanctions, which 
have been implemented since 21 July 2007.22 
Since 1998, developing countries have been entitled to apply for the social 
incentive regime. Again, the European Commission plays an important role in 
decisions on GSP preferences, with the decision-making procedure not referring to 
ILO fi ndings.23 This has been criticized because the Commission lacks the means 
and expertise to make such evaluations and that, once an incentive tariff has been 
granted, the monitoring of labour rights largely depends on Europe’s confi dence 
in, and cooperation with, the benefi ciary country’s authorities.24 Substantially, the 
GSP Regulation referred only to a limited number of the core ILO Conventions: 
benefi ciaries of the additional trade preferences had to comply with the freedom 
of association and child labour conventions, but the forced labour and discrimina-
tion conventions were not mentioned. This provoked the criticism that the EU 
was adopting ‘double standards’.25 Equally, some Member States26 wanted more 
consistency with the ILO’s 1998 Declaration.
These issues were addressed in a 2002 reform. The new GSP Regulation 
required the EU to take the fi ndings of the ILO into account when examining 
applications for GSP incentives. Thus the Commission and the GSP committee 
should no  longer exclusively rely on autonomous investigations. Additionally, the 
legal basis of the incentive clause was extended to all eight of the ILO core con-
ventions. As pointed out by Alston, the key reference in the EU GSP Regulations 
is to the specifi c and hard law ILO Conventions rather than the softer principles 
in the 1998 Declaration.27 However, it should be noted that the GSP Regulations 
talk about the incorporation of the ‘substance of’ the relevant ILO Conventions in 
national legislation and about the effective implementation of these labour rights; 
until 2005, there was no requirement to ratify these conventions.
A more fundamental reform of the EU’s GSP conditionality system was imple-
mented in 2005. One reason for this overhaul was its limited success: only Moldova 
(2000)28 and Sri Lanka (2004)29 had successfully applied for the social incentive 
 21 Commission Decision, OJ 2005, L 213.
 22 Council Regulation, OJ 2007, L 405.
 23 The Commission makes an inquiry into the eligibility of the country involved. It can also carry 
out on-site inspections, assisted by the country’s authorities and possibly also by EU Member States. 
After consulting with the GSP Committee, the Commission decides whether the preferential margin 
will be granted.
 24 Dispersyn, supra n. 19, 103.
 25 Tsogas, supra n. 19, 363–364.
 26 It concerns Sweden, Netherlands, UK, Germany, Denmark and Finland. See GSP Working 
Party, 21 Dec. 1998.
 27 P. Alston, ‘“Core Labour Standards” and the Transformation of the International Labour 
Regime’, European Journal of International Law 3 (2004): 492.
 28 Council Regulation, OJ 2000, L 189. 
 29 Ibid., L 346.
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system.30 This disappointing result can be explained by the cumbersome admin-
istrative procedures, the relatively limited preferential benefi ts compared with the 
standard GSP, the availability of alternative trade systems for exporting to the EU 
market, and ideological resistance against the idea of a social clause.31 But a more 
pressing reason for GSP reform was a case brought against the EU’s GSP system 
before the Dispute Settlement Body of the WTO.
Shortly after 9/11 the EU added Pakistan to the benefi ciaries of the GSP drugs 
system, which provided additional trade preferences to Latin American countries32 
fi ghting drug traffi cking and production. This provoked the Indian government to 
vehemently argue that the EU’s decision was motivated by foreign policy and geo-
political motivations and not justifi ed under the GATT Enabling Clause. Although 
this challenge did not directly concern the labour standard arrangements, it risked 
undermining the legality of any GSP conditionality system.33 The WTO Appellate 
Body, however, ruled that developed countries could grant additional preferences 
if these “respond positively” to the “needs of developing countries”.34 Thus, if it 
is based on objective and transparent criteria, discrimination between developing 
countries may be consistent with international trade law.
As a consequence, Europe’s social GSP necessarily had to become more 
 objective and transparent. In the new GSP Regulation, the EU abandoned the 
separate social, environmental35 and drugs clauses and incorporated these into a 
broader ‘sustainable development and good governance’ regime.36 All ‘vulner-
able’37 countries are eligible for these ‘GSP+’ incentives, provided that they ‘ratify 
and effectively implement’ sixteen human rights conventions, including the eight 
fundamental ILO Conventions,38 and at least seven (out of eleven) conventions 
 30 Pending the GSP reform, there was no decision on the requests by Ukraine, Uzbekistan,  Georgia 
and Mongolia. Russia also applied but requested to postpone the decision for special incentives in 
2002. Georgia and Mongolia became benefi ciaries of the GSP+ scheme (see infra).
 31 Orbie, supra n. 11.
 32 Since 1990 this system had granted additional market access to Andean Community members 
(Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela); in 1998 it was extended to members of the Central 
American Common Market (Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, El Salvador and Panama).
 33 See, e.g., R. Howse, ‘India’s WTO Challenge to Drug Enforcement Conditions in the European 
Community Generalized System of Preferences: A Little Known Case with Major Repercussions for 
“Political” Conditionality in US Trade Policy’, Chicago Journal of International Law 2 (2003).
 34 WTO Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Conditions for the granting of tariff 
preferences to developing countries, para. 165.
 35 The environmental clause included since 1998 had never been used.
 36 Article 8-11.
 37 The defi nition of ‘vulnerable’ is based on a developing country’s share in imports into the EU 
and not on objective development criteria (Art. 9(3)). For a critique, see L. Bartels, ‘The WTO Ruling 
on EC – Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries and Its Implications for Conditionality in GSP 
Programs’, in Human Rights and International Trade, eds T. Cottier et al. (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2005), 742.
 38 In addition to the eight fundamental ILO Conventions, this includes: International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights; International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights; 
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on environment and governance39 by the end of 2008. The Regulation also stipu-
lates that the Commission’s examination of countries requesting special incentives 
‘shall take into account the fi ndings of the relevant international organisations 
and  agencies’ (Article 11(1)); and once a country has been granted these GSP+ 
 preferences, the Commission ‘should monitor the effective implementation of the 
international conventions in accordance with the respective mechanisms thereun-
der…’ (consideration 11), implying that benefi ciary countries’ compliance with 
CLS should be monitored making use of the fi ndings of the relevant ILO bodies.
Thus, the relevance of the ILO has increased considerably through subsequent 
reforms of Europe’s GSP labour standard conditionality system, both in relation to 
the decision-making procedure (taking ILO fi ndings into account) and the substan-
tive content (ILO Conventions). Three stages can be discerned in this evolution: in 
the fi rst GSP Regulation the ILO was barely mentioned (1995); second, the contents 
of some (but not all) conventions were mentioned but without a ratifi cation require-
ment (1998 and 2002); and fi nally the ratifi cation and effective implementation of 
the eight fundamental ILO Conventions became a necessary condition (2005).40 
The ILO’s growing role can be explained by the variety of factors mentioned 
above, in addition to the WTO case by India against Europe’s GSP implying that 
the labour standard conditionality system had to be made more objective. While 
references to ILO Conventions and activities in the Union’s GSP increase the 
legitimacy of its labour standard conditionality system, this raises the obvious 
question of whether the new system is more than a ‘tick the box’ exercise of rati-
fi ed international conventions.
Fifteen countries were included in the GSP+ scheme from 1 January 2006 (see 
Figure 2). These countries are required, by virtue of the scheme, to ratify and imple-
ment the international labour standards contained in the eight core ILO Conven-
tions. The list of benefi ciaries41 reveals that all former drugs benefi ciaries from 
the Andean Community and the Central American Common Market  successfully 
 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination; Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women; Convention against Torture and 
other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment; Convention on the Rights of the Child; 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide; International Convention 
on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid.
 39 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer; Basel Convention on the Con-
trol of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal; Stockholm Conven-
tion on Persistent Organic Pollutants; Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species; 
Convention on Biological Diversity; Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety; Kyoto Protocol to the UN 
Framework Convention on Climate Change; UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (1961); UN 
Convention on Psychotropic Substances (1971); UN Convention against Illicit Traffi c in Narcotic 
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (1988); Mexico UN Convention against Corruption.
 40 Conditionality provisions in the latest GSP amendment (July 2008) are identical to the existing 
system. Council Regulation, OJ 2008, L 211.
 41 Commission Decision, OJ 2005, L 337.
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switched over to GSP+ incentives.42 This raises the question whether the GSP+ 
reform merely amounts to a recycling of the former drugs system, and whether 
ratifi cation of the relevant conventions constitutes anything more than an easy way 
to continue preferences already granted under the previous system.43 In the ILO 
system, ‘ratifi cation is cheap’ as there is little consequence for governments for 
ratifying conventions, yet failing to observe their provisions.44 Compa talks of the 
‘crudeness of ILO ratifi cations as an indicator of respect for workers’ freedom of 
association’.45 In any case, the lack of effective implementation of the ILO core 
conventions by the Latin American benefi ciaries has been profoundly criticized 
by policy makers and NGOs (see Introduction). The GSP Regulation requires the 
European Commission to monitor the implementation of conventions by the GSP+ 
benefi ciaries, taking the ILO fi ndings into account. Although the Commission’s 
internal evaluation is apparently based on interpretations of ILO reports, it is unclear 
what methodology is being used. For all these reasons, the next section engages in a 
more systematic analysis of the implementation record of the countries affected by 
GSP labour standard conditionality, as assessed by the ILO bodies.
VI  Assessing Implementation beyond Ratifi cation: A Pyramid 
of ILO Condemnation
1.  Implementation beyond Ratifi cation: Constructing a Hierarchy 
of ILO Condemnation
The previous section illustrates that the ILO’s role in the Union’s GSP conditional-
ity has become more important; determining the impact of this is more diffi cult. 
Clearly, assessing ratifi cation of conventions is a simple matter as a country has 
either ratifi ed or not; the EU can simply ‘tick the box’ in relation to countries’ 
obligations, without needing to look any deeper. In this regard, two observations 
can be made. First, the EU has only granted GSP+ incentives to countries that 
have ratifi ed the relevant ILO Conventions. In comparison, before 2005, ratifi ca-
tion of these conventions was not required by GSP drugs benefi ciaries. Second, 
the prospect of additional market access46 under GSP+ appears to have positively 
 42 The remaining GSP+ benefi ciary countries are Georgia, Mongolia, Moldova and Sri Lanka. 
The fi rst two countries had applied for the social incentives under the previous GSP, the latter two 
were already benefi ciaries of this system.
 43 J. Orbie & F. De Ville, ‘Core Labour Standards in the GSP Regime of the European Union: 
Overshadowed by Other Considerations’, in Human Rights at Work: Perspectives on Law and 
 Regulation, eds C. Fenwick & T. Novitz (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2009 forthcoming).
 44 E. Neumayer & I. de Soysa, ‘Globalisation and the Right to Free Association and Collective 
Bargaining: An Empirical Analysis’, World Development 34, no. 1 (2006): 31–49, at 34.
 45 L. Compa, ‘Assessing Assessments: A Survey of Efforts to Measure Countries’ Compliance 
with Freedom of Association Standards’, Comparative Labour Law and Policy Journal 24 (2005): 
283–320, at 286.
 46 Imports from GSP+ benefi ciaries into the EU increased in 2006 and 2007 with 15% and 10%, 
respectively.
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affected ratifi cation of ILO core labour conventions in a number of countries – that 
is, Bolivia, Colombia, Venezuela, Mongolia, and El Salvador each ratifi ed one or 
more of the core labour conventions during the period 2005–2006 (see Table 1), 
seemingly because, without those ratifi cations, they would have lost their benefi ci-
ary status. The effect of the GSP carrot is most obvious in the case of El Salva-
dor, where ratifi cation followed the provisional granting of GSP+ preferences. In 
October 2005, the EU temporarily granted El Salvador trade preferences on the 
understanding that the country would ratify ILO Conventions Nos 87 and 98. In 
September 2006, just weeks short of the EU’s deadline when, apparently, trade 
preferences would be withdrawn without full ratifi cation of the ILO core conven-
tions, El Salvador ratifi ed both conventions. The Council accordingly granted El 
Salvador the right to access the GSP+ scheme for the following two years, on the 
basis of the simple fact of ratifi cation.47 However, these preferences may be with-
drawn following a ruling by El Salvador’s Constitutional Court that the ratifi cation 
of Convention No. 87 is inconsistent with its constitution.48
 47 Council Decision, OJ 2006, L 365.
 48 The European Commission has began investigating the impact of this ruling on the observance 
of Convention No. 87 in El Salvador: Commission Decision, OJ 2008, L 108/29.
Table 1. EU GSP Conditionality
Country Status anno 
2008
Status anno 2005 Date of complete ratifi cation of all 
fundamental labour conventions
Bolivia
G
SP
+ 
si
nc
e 
20
05
Drugs GSP (AC) May 2005
Colombia Drugs GSP (AC) January 2005
Costa Rica Drugs GSP (CACM) September 2001
Ecuador Drugs GSP (AC) September 2000
El Salvador Drugs GSP (CACM) September 2006
Georgia Normal GSP July 2002
Guatemala Drugs GSP (CACM) October 2001
Honduras Drugs GSP (CACM) October 2001
Moldova Social GSP June 2002
Mongolia Normal GSP March 2005
Nicaragua Drugs GSP (CACM) November 2000
Panama Drugs GSP (CACM) October 2000
Sri Lanka Social GSP January 2003
Peru Drugs GSP (AC) November 2002
Venezuela Drugs GSP (AC) October 2005
Pakistan Normal GSP Drugs GSP (2002-2005) July 2006
Burma/Myanmar GSP sanctions (since March 1997) (2 ratifi cations)
Belarus GSP sanctions (since June 2007) October 2000
AC = Andean Community; CACM = Central American Common Market.
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As far as implementation of international labour standards is concerned, the 
various ILO committees are expert decision makers through their assessments of 
Member States’ observance of the ratifi ed conventions. Once each year, two com-
mittees supervise the requirement on Member States to report on their implemen-
tation of the Conventions that they have ratifi ed. The Committee of Experts on the 
Application of Conventions and Recommendations (CEACR) provides technical 
supervision of the ILO Conventions and considers the reports made by individual 
countries; these reports are then considered by the Conference Committee on the 
Application of Standards (CAS) which is a tripartite committee allowing dialogue 
between governments and the representatives of employers and workers. For cases 
involving freedom of association, the quasi-judicial Committee on Freedom of 
Association (CFA) decides upon complaints three times each year. At the apex of 
this monitoring system is the Commission of Inquiry (COI), an ad hoc body set up 
by the ILO’s Governing Body in relation to individual complaints.
The reports of these four committees, therefore, provide the authoritative 
technical assessments of labour standards implementation and amount to for-
mal ILO decisions. Nevertheless, it is necessary to decode the ‘very guarded 
language’ of the reports resulting from the ‘constraints of diplomatic niceties’ 
that make them diffi cult to interpret for outsiders.49 ILO criticism of a country’s 
observance of conventions is rarely glaringly obvious; the Organization favours 
encouraging improvements over punishing failures. Furthermore, most com-
mittees refl ect the ILO’s tripartite nature, which inevitably involves a great deal 
of consensually negotiated decisions as to individual countries’ observance of 
the CLS.
A ‘systematic analysis of code phrases’ (ibid.) used by the committees when 
considering individual countries’ observance of conventions is, however, possi-
ble. An assessment of implementation of ILO labour standards requires analysis 
of the wording of the reports that the committees produce recording their consid-
eration of each Member State’s observance of conventions. This can be argued to 
result in a ‘hierarchy of condemnation’ by the ILO’s formal monitoring system 
relating to the Organization’s condemnation of particular countries. The pyramid 
below is a simplifi ed heuristic tool that ‘decodes’ ILO code phrases, highlight-
ing the relative seriousness which the ILO has assigned to particular infringe-
ments of Conventions by individual countries through listing the code phrases 
in an order that indicates the levels of seriousness that they represent. The code 
phrases are therefore incorporated into a scale which indicates the seriousness of 
CLS breaches by placement in one of a series of levels of condemnation. This 
pyramid was created through an analysis of the committees’ reports, taking into 
account past experience within the International Labour Standards Department of 
the International Labour Offi ce.
 49 Compa, supra n. 46, 306.
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Figure 1. Decoding ILO Assessments: A Pyramid of ILO Condemnation
Article 33
Commision
of
Inquiry
CFA - serious and
urgent case
CFA - notes with alarm,
observes with deep regret,
strongly requests,
deeply deplores
CFA - requests as a matter of 
urgency, regrets, notes with concern, deplores
CFA - expects, trusts, hopes, requests
Level 4
Level 5
Level 3
Level 2
Level 4
Level 5
Level 3
Level 2
Level 1Level 1
CAS - continued
failure to 
implement
CAS - inclusion in a
special paragraph
CAS - consideration
and discussion
CEACR - footnote (single or doble)
CEACR - deplores, notes with 
deep concern
CEACR - notes with concern, regrets to note
CEACR - urges, trusts, hopes, expects, requests
2.  Judging EU GSP Decisions against ILO Assessments
The following sections will use this pyramid to assess the level of criticism made 
by the ILO of GSP+ benefi ciaries and GSP sanctioned countries. It attempts to 
gain more analytical insight into (in)consistencies between the Union’s applica-
tion of GSP incentives and the implementation of CLS as assessed by the ILO in 
respect to the EU’s stated objective to act in conformity with multilateral organiza-
tions such as the ILO.
(a) Sanctions: drawing a clear line between levels 4 and 5. There is a clear con-
sistency between the application of GSP sanctions by the EU and the hierarchy 
of ILO condemnation. Since 1995 when the unilateral withdrawal of trade prefer-
ences became possible, the EU has taken steps to impose sanctions only in relation 
to Burma and Belarus. Equally, in the same period, the ILO has established a COI 
only in relation to Burma and Belarus. As noted above, the COI is the highest ILO 
committee in terms of a simple hierarchy of condemnation.
Thus, the EU appears to draw a line between levels 4 and 5 on the hierarchy of 
condemnation in its decisions to withdraw GSP preferences. This is not only in line 
with a strong denunciation on the part of the ILO, but is also in line with a more 
general disapproval of the international community: GSP sanctions against Burma 
and Belarus are embedded in a set of broader foreign policy initiatives targeting the 
ruling regimes of these countries.50 The EU would only withdraw trade  preferences 
 50 E.g., ban on entry visas, suspension of high-level visits, expulsion of Burma’s military personnel in 
Europe, suspension of development aid, arms embargo. See Council Common Position, OJ 2006, L 116.
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for breach of labour standards in cases in which the ILO has unambiguously held 
that such breach has not only occurred but has been persistent and serious.
The case of Pakistan seems to confi rm the observation that Europe will not apply 
sanctions before the establishment of a COI. In 1997 the EU received a complaint 
alleging the use of child labour in the country. ILO committees had not commented 
on its observance of the child labour conventions in 1997, simply because the coun-
try had not ratifi ed those conventions and so was not bound by either of them. 
Another possible trade union action at the international level was through the EU, 
although the complaint had to be worded as forced labour to fi t within the GSP 
Regulation at the time. Although various other reasons could explain the EU’s 
decision in this case,51 the absence of formal condemnation of Pakistan by the ILO 
may have contributed. In any event, the EU could not refer to any formal and legal 
decisions of ILO supervisory bodies, expressing the ILO’s technical opinion, as 
there were none.
Despite signifi cant criticism of Pakistan by the ILO since then,52 Pakistan 
became a benefi ciary of Europe’s GSP drugs preferences regime in 2001. Con-
demnation at level 3 of the pyramid seems not to be a suffi cient reason to change 
GSP status. This observation will be confi rmed in the analysis of GSP+ benefi cia-
ries (see below).
Thus, the EU threshold for GSP sanctions is high. When the GSP+ system was 
proposed, Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy wanted to ease developing countries’ 
resistance to a social clause and talked about ‘a distinctive type of foreign policy 
built around persuasion and incentives rather than threats and demands’.53 Accord-
ingly, the question is raised whether these incentives have been consistently and 
successfully applied.
(b) Incentives: anything under level 5 is fi ne. The question of GSP incentives is 
more diffi cult to assess. Here, the full complexity of assessing implementation of 
labour standards is evident. On the surface, it appears that any country judged to 
fall below level 5 on the pyramid – the apparent threshold for GSP sanctions – is 
eligible for incentives. There seems to be no differentiation by the EU between the 
varying levels of condemnation below the most serious.
This is clear in relation to the situation in 2005, when the decision to include 
fi fteen countries in the GSP+ scheme was taken, as many of those countries were 
not performing well in terms of implementation. A ‘snapshot’ of what the ILO com-
mittees had concluded about those countries in the months immediately prior to the 
time that the decision was taken shows that there were instances of real  concern with 
implementation. Most obviously, Panama, Guatemala, Venezuela and  Colombia 
 51 See supra n. 19.
 52 Pakistan has been condemned at level 3 of the pyramid: re-freedom of association and collec-
tive bargaining, see, e.g., CFA Case 2096 (2004) and the CAS 1998 and 2001; re-forced labour, see 
CAS 2002.
 53 Lamy, supra n. 2. 
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were called before the CAS on account of their observation of Convention No. 87 in 
2005, one month before the decision to include these countries in the GSP+ scheme 
was taken. This places these three countries at level 3 of the pyramid in terms of 
seriousness. Equally, in the three sessions of the CFA in 2005, 40 of the 105 cases 
– concerning ten of the fi fteen countries54 – related to GSP+ benefi ciary countries. 
In other words, of the cases alleging breach of freedom of association submitted to 
the ILO in that year, a disproportionate number were in relation to countries then 
chosen for the GSP+ scheme. While these countries may not in fact be the worst 
examples of non-observance of freedom of association in the world, workers’ and 
employers’ organizations chose to focus on those cases over others.
Even at the less serious levels of the pyramid, it is clear that the CEACR had con-
cerns about various of the GSP benefi ciary countries in the year before they were 
awarded the incentives. Georgia had not submitted any periodic reports for the 
CEACR report published in 2005, suggesting a lack of commitment to the ILO’s 
labour standards, as well as its process; it was condemned at level 2 on the pyra-
mid. Sri Lanka, Mongolia and Costa Rica equally failed to provide some reports 
for that year. El Salvador submitted some reports, but the CEACR expressed its 
‘deep concern’ about certain matters in the country; for that reason, it falls within 
level 2 of the pyramid. Despite the provision of reports by Moldova and the enact-
ment of new legislation, the Committee found it necessary to ‘request once again’ 
certain information that had not been provided by the Government.
On the other hand, others of the fi fteen countries could be rated more positively. 
The CEACR ‘noted with satisfaction’, its most positive evaluation, changes in rela-
tion to the freedom of association conventions in Nicaragua. While the  Committee 
was also positive about some changes in Nicaragua in relation to Convention No. 
182, it was concerned about other matters falling within this convention. Likewise, 
Honduras, Ecuador and Bolivia were all the subject of positive affi rmations on 
account of some changes, accompanied by less positive statements; these countries 
were condemned at level 1 of the pyramid.
Thus, it seems that in 2005 the group of fi fteen countries awarded trade 
 preferences by the EU could in no way be considered to be a homogenous group 
in terms of their implementation of core labour conventions. In fact, the diversity 
of their implementation is striking, with some countries having shown clear signs 
of an improving implementation, and others being seriously criticized. For those 
countries with positive comments from the ILO committees, it could be argued that 
inclusion within the GSP+ scheme was a reward for improvements in their imple-
mentation of labour standards. That, however, is clearly not so for all the fi fteen 
countries chosen to receive trade preferences under the GSP+ scheme in 2005. 
For these countries, membership in the GSP+ scheme can only be justifi ed as 
having been intended to provide an incentive to improvement in behaviour. But, 
 54 Only Bolivia, Ecuador, Georgia, Honduras and Moldova were not criticized by the CFA during 
2005.
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although inclusion into the GSP+ might indeed have stimulated the ratifi cation 
of CLS by some countries (see above), an improvement in implementation over 
time is not evident. In the majority of cases, the level of condemnation on the 
pyramid has remained fairly static. This is the case in relation to Honduras, Ecua-
dor, Nicaragua, Georgia, Peru and Moldova; in relation to Guatemala, Costa Rica, 
and Venezuela, the position on the pyramid may be static, but it is high – these 
countries have continued to be considered by the CAS in relation to the freedom 
of association conventions during this time, remaining at level 3 on the pyramid. 
Colombia has equally continued to be seriously condemned by the CFA, constantly 
remaining at level 3 or 4 on the pyramid. Panama, Mongolia and Bolivia have con-
tinued to provide late reports for the CEACR, suggesting a less than committed 
stance toward labour standards. The only suggestions for slight improvements are 
the cases of El Salvador (cf. also ratifi cation – see above), whose implementation 
of the child labour conventions has improved, and Sri Lanka, in which there are 
improvements in relation to its provision of reports and legislative changes. Inci-
dentally, both these countries have recently been investigated for violations of the 
GSP+ conventions (see below).
In other words, the EU GSP+ scheme has not led to an overall improvement 
in labour standards implementation in those countries. This is exemplifi ed by the 
cases considered by the CFA. For example, in its last session for 2007, the CFA 
considered an extraordinarily large number of cases from the GSP benefi ciary 
countries. Of the thirty-six cases considered by the Committee in that session, 
twenty-two were from GSP+ countries – that is, ten of the fi fteen GSP+ countries 
were the subject of a consideration by the Committee of Freedom of Associa-
tion, and fell at least on level 1 of the pyramid.55 Furthermore, of the six cases 
singled out for special mention as ‘special and urgent cases’, three were from 
GSP+ countries: one was a case against Colombia, and two were Guatemalan. 
These cases were, therefore, classifi ed at level 4 on the pyramid of condemna-
tion. Of the remaining cases considered by the Committee, many were serious 
cases, falling at levels 2 (Colombia, Venezuela, Costa Rica, and Guatemala) or 
3 (Honduras).
V  Conclusions
Committed to promoting the social dimension of globalization, the European 
Union has highlighted its strengthened cooperation with the ILO as well as the 
labour conditionality in its trade instruments. The EU’s GSP scheme combines 
both elements, by granting or withdrawing trade preferences according to a devel-
oping country’s observation or violation of labour standards. This article has shown 
 55 That is, Colombia, Sri Lanka, Moldova, Venezuela, El Salvador, Costa Rica, Ecuador, 
 Guatemala, Honduras and Peru; while Georgia, Mongolia, Bolivia, Nicaragua and Panama were not 
the subject of cases in this session.
678 JAN ORBIE AND LISA TORTELL
that the role of the ILO in the Union’s GSP has gradually increased: the CLS as 
embodied in the eight core ILO Conventions are now explicitly used as a point 
of reference, and the Union has also indicated its intention to take the fi ndings of 
the ILO bodies into account when sanctioning or rewarding third countries. There 
are several explanations for the growing role of the ILO in the Europe’s external 
relations. However, the proof of the pudding is in the eating, and various actors 
have questioned whether benefi ciaries of the Union’s GSP incentives have indeed 
implemented the relevant ILO Conventions. It is clear that the EU considers ratifi -
cation as a necessary precondition, but even when considering the conclusions of 
the competent ILO bodies there is the suggestion that labour standard conditional-
ity has not been consistent with implementation records.
In order to provide a more systematic analysis, we developed a ‘pyramid of ILO 
condemnation’ as a heuristic tool for decoding the phrases used by the various 
ILO committees. First, the application of sanctions by the EU in its GSP scheme 
is consistent with ILO specialist assessments of countries’ observance of ILO 
Conventions. In sanctioning developing countries the Union has drawn a clear 
line between levels 4 and 5 on the pyramid of condemnation. It seems that the 
EU would only take such drastic steps as the withdrawal of trade preferences for 
breach of labour standards in cases in which the ILO bodies (and other institutions) 
have unambiguously held that such breach has not only occurred but has been per-
sistent and serious. Thus, the EU has lived up to its intention to use incentive-based 
rather than punitive social clauses. 
Second, the EU’s granting of GSP+ incentives is less clearly consistent with 
a reading of the ILO committees’ reports. The system has been successful in 
 ensuring the full ratifi cation of the eight fundamental labour standards among 
the benefi ciary countries, as exemplifi ed by the case of El Salvador. However, 
several countries have received GSP+ trade preferences despite being seriously 
criticized by the authoritative ILO committees for their implementation of the rel-
evant  conventions. Looking more closely at the position of the GSP+ benefi ciaries 
on the pyramid, it can be concluded (1) that there is a large variety between these 
countries in terms of implementation, ranging from relatively serious condem-
nations (for example, in the case of Colombia, Guatemala, Venezuela) to rather 
positive remarks (for example, for Bolivia, Ecuador, Honduras); and (2) that 
these observations are relatively static over time with no real noticeable changes 
between 2005 and 2008.
This suggests that, in the selection of GSP+ benefi ciaries, path dependencies 
from the previous GSP drugs and labour regimes have played a role. When the 
GSP drugs arrangement was ruled illegal by the Appellate Body of the WTO, 
the Union reformed its GSP and introduced the GSP+ conditionality system. In 
2005 all the former drugs benefi ciaries became GSP+ countries, so that they did 
not suffer from decreased access to the European market. In order to be eligible, 
some of these Latin American countries had to ratify the relevant ILO Conven-
tions, but implementation requirements have been more vague. Thus, the GSP 
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reform of 2005 was less radical than it seems. The new list of GSP+ benefi ciaries 
of December 2008 confi rms this.56 Since some countries that are high on our scale 
of condemnation still benefi t from GSP+ preferences, the EU remains  vulnerable 
for criticism that it only considers the ratifi cation criterion. For example, when 
the EU rejected the GSP+ applications by Nigeria and Gabon because they had not 
ratifi ed one of the relevant conventions, this formal shortcoming was contrasted 
with Colombia’s continuing GSP+ treatment despite serious violations of basic 
labour rights.57
Third, there are no cases of GSP+ preferences being withdrawn, despite the 
 Regulation providing for such a ‘middle-ground’ option whereby sanctioned coun-
tries would move back not to MFN tariffs but to standard GSP rates. European pol-
icy makers may have reasoned that the diplomatic damage from sanctions would 
be greater than the expected benefi t in pushing countries into implementation of 
ILO Conventions. Even excluding diplomatic costs, however, the effectiveness of 
sanctions to stimulate implementation of labour standards can be doubted, thus jus-
tifying its careful use. Path dependencies also explain why the EU’s institutional 
system makes it relatively diffi cult to remove GSP+ benefi ciaries from the incen-
tive system: it is biased toward the status quo since any Commission  initiative to 
withdraw incentives can be challenged by a blocking minority in the Council of 
Ministers – unless it concerns gross violations of ILO Conventions that cannot 
 easily be ignored by the Council.58
In the near future the EU’s willingness and ability to withdraw GSP+ preferences 
may become clearer, following ongoing investigations against violations of the 
GSP+ conventions in El Salvador and Sri Lanka.59 However, the 2008 list of GSP+ 
benefi ciaries already confi rms that several countries that are placed relatively high 
on the pyramid of ILO condemnation will continue to benefi t from special prefer-
ences.60 The European Commission’s report on the effective implementation of the 
 56 The list remains largely unchanged. Panama and Moldova have disappeared but not for political 
reasons (see infra); while Paraguay, Armenia and Azerbaijan are added. Commission Decision, OJ 
2008, L 334/90.
 57 David Cronin, IPS, 22 Dec. 2008.
 58 The case of Belarus shows that even the ‘normal’ sanctioning procedure is time consuming and 
prone to opposition from EU Member States. While the complaint against Belarus was made in 2003, 
it took until 2007 before sanctions were established. The delay was partly caused by the EU’s wish to 
monitor the situation in Belarus and wait for ILO reports in this regard, but also related to practises 
of ‘classic horse-trading’ between Member States. When the Commission proposed sanctions, these 
were opposed by Poland, Lithuania and Latvia because they would hurt ordinary Belarusians and 
because they would damage their own cross-border importers; Italy, Greece and Cyprus also opposed 
the sanctions wishing to punish the UK, Germany and Sweden for blocking antidumping measures 
against Chinese shoes (EU Observer, 29 Sep. 2006).
 59 In the case of El Salvador, it concerns labour standard conventions (see supra). In the case of 
Sri Lanka, it concerns violations against the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Convention 
against Torture, and the Convention on the Rights of Child. See Commission Decision, OJ 2008, 
L 277/34.
 60 Panama was excluded because its application missed the deadline, and Moldova because it 
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conventions according to the international monitoring bodies merely reproduces 
comments for each country and each convention, while analysis is limited to the 
statement that these ‘reveal various shortcomings in the implementation process 
but in general demonstrate a satisfactory state of play’.61 
A more sophisticated analysis in conformity with assessments of international 
bodies would allow for a more refi ned use of the GSP conditionality system, in 
 particular its middle-ground option.62 Further differentiation among potential 
GSP+ benefi ciaries, in conformity with ILO and other assessments over time, may 
be justifi able. This would help the EU to move beyond ‘ticking the box’ in terms of 
ratifi cations. The impact of the EU’s GSP+ on ratifi cation of ILO Conventions sug-
gests that this option could infl uence countries’ implementation of CLS as clearly 
the EU has the trade leverage to cause changes when it takes a determined line. 
Such an approach could allow the EU to focus on applying pressure on countries 
in relation to the more serious of breaches of core conventions, without resorting 
to the use of a ‘stick’. In doing so, it could be considered to reinforce the ILO 
committees’ work in relation to the observance of the fundamental conventions63 
and increase the legitimacy of the ILO as a whole. It would address the concern 
that countries which have repeatedly been condemned by the ILO receive GSP+ 
preferences and thus increase the legitimacy of the EU’s conditionality system. 
Ultimately, an objective and transparent use of the Union’s GSP sticks and  carrots, 
in accordance with ILO fi ndings, may help to break the impasse in the debate 
on a social clause and re-establish the legitimacy of labour considerations in the 
 international trade regime.
exports under another trade arrangement; these decisions are unrelated to implementation of the 
conventions.
 61 European Commission, ‘Report on the status of ratifi cation and recommendations by  monitoring 
bodies’, 21 Oct. 2008.
 62 Of course, creating a fi nite and non-porous line between imposing sanctions and granting incen-
tives requires a subtlety beyond that contained in the pyramid. It also involves a political decision 
by the EU, based on matters that are outside the inherent logic of the ILO system. For example, the 
European Parliament has suggested that GSP+ preferences should be withdrawn when the ILO CAS 
has devoted a ‘special paragraph’ to a country – i.e., between levels 3 and 4 of our pyramid.
European Parliament, ‘Draft legislation resolution on the proposal for a Council Regulation applying 
a GSP scheme from 1 January 2009 to 31 December 2011’ (Committee on International Trade, 29 
May 2008), 18.
 63 Although note, of course, that the ILO committees’ reports are intended to provide technical 
and tripartite consideration of the implementation of labour standards for the purposes of the govern-
ments involved – and are not intended to operate as sources for external assessments. Their use in 
what could amount to trade disadvantage could potentially be argued to harm the ILO system, with 
its exclusively non-sanction-based approach.
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